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DEVELOPING THE COMMON LAW OF
BREACH OF PROMISE AND UNIVERSAL
PARTNERSHIPS: RIGHTS TO PROPERTY
SHARING FOR ALL COHABITANTS?*
ELSJE BONTHUYSt
School of Law, University of the W/itwatersrand, Johannesburg
In recent years the Supreme Court of Appeal has embarked on a rapid andfar-reaching set
of developments of the common law relating to engagements and universal partnerships
between cohabitants, culminating in Butters v Mncora. This series of cases is
groundbreaking in four respects:first, in holding that engaged and cohabiting partners can
enter into universal partnerships encompassing both commercial and non-commercial
undertakings; secondly, that the partnership agreement does not have to be express, but
can be inferred from the partners' conduct during the relationship; thirdly, that the test for
the existence of such a partnership is 'whether it is more probable than not that a tacit
agreement had been reached', and, finally, that nonfinancial contributions to the
partnership, such as childcare and homemaking, should be taken into account. These cases
have created an avenue by which cohabitants can circumvent the narrow approach adopted
by the Constitutional Court in Volks v Robinson NO to lay claim to some of the
financial assets which were accumulated during the existence of the partnership. This
article traces the development of the law, and evaluates the law relating to engagements
and universal partnerships respectively. It argues that the extension of property rights to
cohabitants is accompanied by a simultaneous restriction on the rights traditionally
available for breach of promise. These two areas of law remain marked by contradictory
assertions that, on the one hand, breach of promise should not be treated like a commercial
contract while, on the other hand, contractual principles are applied to limit the claims
which had hitherto been available for breach of promise. Nevertheless, both in the case of
breach of promise and universal partnerships the principles of contract law are not correctly
applied, but instead are slightly altered to the detriment ofclaims byfemale cohabitants.
I INTRODUCTION
The Constitutional Court's 2005 judgment in Volks NO v Robinson' has been
widely regarded as a setback for the extension of legal rights to opposite-sex
cohabitants. The majority of the court held that an unmarried opposite-sex
cohabitant is not a spouse under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act
27 of 1990.2 According to Smith, this judgment 'effectively put paid to the
* My thanks to Deeksha Bhana and the reviewers of this article for their helpful
comments.
tBA LLB LLM (Stell) PhD (Cantab).
2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC).
2 In Daniels v Campell NO 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) the same court held that Muslim
spouses are included in the definition of'spouse' under the Act.
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judicial extension of matrimonial law to unmarried opposite-sex cohabiting
life partners'. 3
The most trenchant and common critique of the case 4 has focused on the
premise underlying the majority judgment, described by Ngcobo J in his
separate concurringjudgment in the following terms:
'The law places no legal impediment to [sic] heterosexual couples involved in
permanent life partnerships from getting married .... Their entitlement to
protection under the Act, therefore, depends on their decision whether to
marry or not.'
5
Albertyn positions the criticism of this reliance on individual choice in Volks
in the context of the need for ajurisprudence of substantive equality that aims
to transform and dislodge hierarchical social structures which disadvantage
certain vulnerable groups within our society. She argues that
'[a] transformatory approach to co-habiting relationships would acknowledge
and understand the conditions that have shaped the legal exclusion of such
relationships, as well as the social and economic inequalities that shape women's
choices in relationships. It would also set terms for the recognition of a broader
range of relationships, other than marriage, as fundamental to our society, and
provide remedies that ensure the affirmation and protection of the parties in
these relationships, and seek to enhance the choices ofvulnerable parties within
relationships. '6
While the majorityjudgment in Volks has indeed had a negative impact upon
the transformatory project, its effects have been ameliorated from an
unexpected quarter. In the past few years the Supreme Court of Appeal has
embarked on a rapid and far-reaching set of developments of the common
law relating to engagements and opposite-sex cohabitation. This series of
cases, culminating in Butters v Mncora,7 is groundbreaking in four respects:
first, in holding that engaged and cohabiting partners can enter into universal
partnerships encompassing both commercial and non-commercial undertak-
3 Bradley Smith 'Rethinking Volks v Robinson: The implications of applying a
"contextualised choice model" to prospective South African domestic partnerships
legislation' (2010) 13 PER 238 at 238. See, however, the development of the com-
mon law represented in Paixao v Road Accident Fund 2012 (6) SA377 (SCA).
4 See, for instance, Smith op cit note 3; Craig Lind 'Domestic partnerships and
marital status discrimination' 2005 ActaJuridica 108 at 122-3; Lawrence Schifer 'Mar-
riage and marriage-like relationships: Constructing a new hierarchy of life partner-
ships' (2006) 123 SALJ 626 at 632-3; Catherine Albertyn 'Substantive equality and
transformation in South Africa' (2007) 23 SAJHR 253 at 266-7; E Bonthuys 'Institu-
tional openness and resistance to feminist arguments: The example of the South
African Constitutional Court' (2007) 19 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1 at
23-6; Marius Pieterse 'Finding for the applicant? Individual plaintiffs and group-
based disadvantage' (2008) 24 SAJHR 397 at 410-12; Helen Kruuse 'Here's to you,
Mrs Robinson": Peculiarities and paragraph 29 in determining the treatment of
domestic partnerships' (2009) 25 SAJHR 380 at 384.
5 Volks NO v Robinson supra note 1 para 91.
6 Op cit note 4 at 265.
7 2012 (4) SA1 (SCA).
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ings;8 secondly, that the partnership agreement does not have to be express,
but can be inferred from the partners' conduct during the relationship;
thirdly, that the test for the existence of such a partnership is 'whether it is
more probable than not that a tacit agreement had been reached';9 and,
finally, that non-financial contributions to the partnership such as childcare
and homemaking should be taken into account.' 0 These cases have created
an avenue by which cohabitants can circumvent the narrow approach in
olks to lay claim to some of the financial assets which were accumulated
during the existence of the partnership, if not to a right to maintenance
during or after the relationship.
Part II of this article will trace the development of the law relating to
engagements and cohabitation, starting with a description of the common
law as it stood, before discussing the four cases and the changes which they
made to the common law. This will be followed by an evaluation of the law
relating to engagements and universal partnerships respectively in part III. I
will argue that, while property rights were extended to cohabitants who are
also engaged to be married, this extension occurred alongside a parallel
process restricting the ambit of claims which had formerly been available for
breach of promise. Moreover, the courts' insistence that breach of promise
should not be treated like commercial contracts is repeatedly contradicted by
the application of contractual principles to limit the claims. Nevertheless,
those contractual principles are slightly altered to limit the claims which the
partners would have had, usually to the detriment of female cohabitants. In
the conclusion I evaluate the disadvantages and benefits associated with the
move from breach of promise to universal partnerships and the applicability
of the paradigm of contract to intimate relationships in general.
II DEVELOPMENTS OF THE COMMON LAW RELATING TO
ENGAGEMENTS AND OPPOSITE-SEX LIFE PARTNERSHIPS
Prior to the recent developments which will be discussed below, the
remedies for breach of promise remained largely as set out in the 1965 case of
Bull v Taylor." Where an engagement was repudiated, the aggrieved party's
remedies were a unique combination of delictual and contractual remedies,12
including the return of gifts given in contemplation of the marriage. The
main delictual remedy was a claim for sentimental damages, which were not
awarded unless the aggrieved party could prove that her feelings or
reputation were injured.13 Where the engagement was terminated without a
s Ibidparas 15, 18.
9 Ibidpara 17.
'0 Ibidparas 19, 22.
11 1965 (4) SA29 (A).
12 Ibidat 37A-B.
13 Ibid at 38F-H. In Guggenheim v Rosenbaum 1961 (4) SA21 (W) at 36A-B it was
held that the breach had to be 'injurious or contumelious' to found a claim for
sentimental damages.
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justa causa, contractual damages were awarded separately for actual loss
(wasted expenditure) and prospective loss.14 Actual loss would typically
encompass expenditure on wedding preparations and loss of earnings where a
party had given up her employment in contemplation of the marriage.
Compensation for the financial benefits which would have resulted from the
marriage could be claimed as prospective loss, but these claims were subject
to reduction according to a range of factors such as the expected duration of
the marriage, the probability ofbeing married in community ofproperty, and
the plaintiffs chances of remarriage. It must be emphasised that although
contractual damages were available for breach of promise, the sui generis
nature of legal remedies for breach of promise meant that the calculation of
these contractual damages did not follow the normal contractual principles
and methods.15
An action for breach of promise was often accompanied by claims based
on seduction, maternity expenses and maintenance where a child was born as
a result of the relationship. The action for seduction was 'available to the
virgin who has been seduced, that is, who has parted with her virtue at the
solicitation of a man'.16 This action, also available to people who were
subject to customary law,'7 may have fallen into disuse because female
virginity is no longer widely regarded as essential to the ability to conclude an
advantageous marriage.'
Thus was the state of the common law before it was developed by the four
cases which I discuss below. None of the four cases deal with the action for
seduction or with claims flowing from the birth of children. These issues are
therefore not considered in this article.
The constitutional obligation to develop the common law to give effect to
the rights protected in the Bill of Rights, and the indirect horizontal
application of the Bill of Rights, 19 have precipitated numerous changes to
14 Guggenheim v Rosenbaum supra note 13 at 36-7.
15 For further discussion, see the discussion and footnotes in part 111(b) below.
16 Bull v Taylor supra note 11 at 34B-C.
17 Ex Parte Minister of Home Affairs: In Re Yako v Beyi 1948 (1) SA388 (A).
" But see T W Bennett, C Mills & G Munnick 'The anomalies of seduction: A
statutory crime or an obsolete, unconstitutional delict?' (2009) 126 SALJ 879, who
argue that it served the purpose ofprotecting young women and children from sexual
exploitation.
19 Section 8(2), 8(3), 9(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996. See generally Alfred Cockrell 'Private law and the Bill of Rights: A threshold
issue of "horizontality"' in Bill of Rights Compendium (Service Issue 10, 2001) para
3A2; A P H Cockrell 'Adjudication styles in South African private law' (1993) 56
THRHR 590; Alfred Cockrell 'Rainbow jurisprudence' (1996) 12 SAJHR 1; Johan
van der Walt 'Progressive indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights:
Towards a co-operative relation between common-law and constitutional jurispru-
dence' (2001) 17 SAJHR 340.
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family law rules since 1994,20 gradually aligning family law with the
constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the bases of race, sex, gender,
culture, religion, sexual orientation and marital status. 21 Particularly impor-
tant for this article is the need for the rules relating to engagements and
cohabitation to achieve substantive, rather than formal, gender equality. 22
Substantively equal legal rules would not merely treat men and women in the
same way, but would take account of the current and historical disadvantage
caused by the legal, social and economic contexts affecting women in their
intimate relationships and would aim to overcome gendered disadvantage. 23
The concluding part returns to this issue in more detail.
(a) Sepheri v Scanlan 24
Davis J's expressions of disquiet about the remedies for breach of promise in
Sepheri v Scanlan (involving both an engagement and cohabitation) was a
harbinger of the far-reaching changes subsequently wrought by the Supreme
Court of Appeal. The case involved an engaged couple who had cohabited
for eight years. The plaintiff had given up her employment in Scandinavia to
follow the defendant to several countries where he worked, finally settling in
South Africa, where the relationship came to an end.
Agreeing with Sinclair 25 andJoubert, 26 who argued for the abolition of the
action for breach of promise, Davis J expressed the opinion that the current
form of the action for breach of promise
,appears to place the marital relationship on a rigid contractual footing and thus
raises questions as to whether, in the constitutional context where there is
recognition of diverse forms of intimate personal relationships, it is still
advisable that, if one party seeks to extract himself or herself from the initial
intention to conclude the relationship, this should be seen purely within the
context of contractual damages.' 27
20 For a discussion, see Elsje Bonthuys 'Commitments to gender equality in South
African family law: "Unpredictable and sporadic?"' in Jaya Sagade, Vedna Jivan &
Christine Foster (eds) Feminism in the Subcontinent and Beyond: Challenging Laws,
Changing Laws (2014) 193; Elsje Bonthuys 'The South African Bill of Rights and the
development of family law' (2002) 119 SALJ 748.
21 Section 9(3) of the Constitution.
22 Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt 'Facing the challenge of transformation: Diffi-
culties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality' (1998) 14
SAJHR 248 at 251.
23 See Albertyn & Goldblatt op cit note 22; Saras Jagwanth & Christina Murray
'Ten years of transformation: How has gender equality in South Africa fared?' (2002)
14 CJVVL 255; Elsje Bonthuys 'Institutional openness and resistance to feminist argu-
ments: The example of the SouthAfrican Constitutional Court' (2008) 20 CJI'L 1.
24 2008 (1) 5A322 (C).
2 5 June D Sinclair &Jacqueline Heaton The Law ofMarriage vol 1 (1996) 314n8.
26 DJJoubert 'Die gevolge van troubreuk -'n Kontempor&re beskouing' (1990)
23 DeJure 201 at 214.
27 Sepheri v Scanlan supra note 24 at 3301-331A.
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Davis J and the authors whom he quoted thus raised two issues around the
action for breach of promise. The first is whether such an action should
continue to be available in our law at all and, secondly, whether contractual
remedies in the form of damages are appropriate for breach of engagement.
Because he felt that reform of these rules should be undertaken by a higher
court or the legislature, DavisJ decided the case on the basis of the common
law as it stood, and his remarks about the continued existence of these
remedies are therefore obiter dicta.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs claim for sentimental damages. This was
based on the fact that the defendant's behaviour in ending the relationship
during the process of litigation, although hurtful to the plaintiff, resulted
from the breakdown of the relationship and the normal conflict associated
with acrimonious litigation.28 Half of the claim for contractual damages for
prospective loss was awarded on the basis that the plaintiffs chances of
remarriage were good.29 The claim was for 50 per cent of the defendant's
assets, including the common home and furnishings, vehicles, shares and
savings accounts. In effect, therefore, the defendant was awarded 25 per cent
of the existing assets. 3° It must be noted that although the court treated this as
a claim for prospective loss due to breach ofpromise, the amounts claimed do
not in fact represent a share of assets to be accumulated in a future marriage.
In fact, the plaintiffs claim was for a share of the defendant's existing assets,
which did not fall within the historical understanding of the scope of claims
for the breach of promise. The claim for a share of existing assets could be
categorised as a claim for specific performance of a contract of universal
partnership, rather than being based on breach of promise.
Although the plaintiff had at first lodged an alternative claim on the basis of
universal partnership, she eventually abandoned this alternative claim.
Nevertheless, the issue had to be decided because the defendant counter-
claimed rental for the period during which the plaintiff occupied the
common home after the end of the relationship, and for the eviction of the
plaintiff from the home. The plaintiff argued that these claims should fail
because she was a co-owner of the house as a result of the universal
partnership. Foreshadowing the ruling in Butters v Mncora, DavisJ held that a
universal partnership could be established tacitly if this was the more
probable inference from the evidence before the court.31 Despite accepting
the evidence that the parties had shared all their assets equally during the
relationship and that the plaintiff had on several occasions spoken of sharing
all the assets equally between the parties, there was no evidence that he had
the necessary animus contrahendi to conclude a universal partnership.32
21 Ibidat 337E-I.
29 Ibidat 337C-E.
30 Amounting in total to R654 625.00 and R10 854.00 in Finnish currency.
31 Sepheri v Scanlan supra note 24 at 338E-F.
32 Ibid at 339A-J.
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The court's factual findings can be questioned. Despite holding that the
defendant was an unreliable witness and the plaintiff a credible one, the court
attached more weight to the defendant's steadfast failure to register the
common home in the name of both parties than to the plaintiffs evidence
that he had assured her on numerous occasions that they owned all the assets
in common. 33 This failure on the part of the defendant also seems to have
trumped the parties' sharing of their income in the earlier stages of the
relationship and the fact that the plaintiff had given up a lucrative career to
live abroad where the plaintiff worked. 34 Because a universal partnership was
held not to exist, the court ordered an amount of R250 000 to be paid to the
defendant as rent for the common home. This represented 38 per cent of the
amount awarded to the plaintiff, leaving her with a total of R404 625 (in
addition to some money in Finish currency). Given the costs of legal
proceedings, it is probably safe to conclude that the plaintiff walked out of an
eight-year cohabitation and engagement relationship without substantial
financial assets, despite having given up her career for most of this time.
(b) VanJaarsveld v Bridges35
Unlike the other cases under discussion, the parties in this case did not
cohabit and were engaged for only six months. While the defendant was a
relatively wealthy farmer, the plaintiff had a lucrative career in entertainment
and had previously been married four times. She had also entered into a new
relationship within a month of the termination of her engagement to the
defendant.36
The Supreme Court ofAppeal eagerly grasped the opportunity to provide
guidelines for the future reform of the common law, with Harms DP holding
that
,the time has arrived to recognise that the historic approach to engagements is
outdated and does not recognise the mores of our time, and that public policy
considerations require that our courts must reassess the law relating to breach of
promise. In what follows I intend to give some guidance to courts faced with
such claims without reaching any definite conclusion, because this case is not
affected by any possible development of the law and can be decided with
reference to two factual issues. . .. .37
In providing this guidance the Supreme Court of Appeal suggested restrict-
ing the availability of the existing common-law remedies in four respects:
what constitutes a just cause for ending an engagement; the availability of
sentimental damages; contractual claims for prospective loss; and the circum-
stances under which actual loss can be claimed.
33 Ibidat 339H-J.
34 See the discussion of Butters v Mncora supra note 7 in part 11(d) below. The
minority judgment in Butters treated the evidence in the same way. See also part 111(c)
for further discussion of this issue.
35 2010 (4) SA558 (SCA).
36 Ibidparas 12, 15.
37 Ibidpara 3.
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In relation to a just cause for ending an engagement, the court compared
the termination of an engagement with divorce, which is available on the
basis of irretrievable breakdown, and held that there was no reason for a
higher standard to be imposed for breach of promise. Any reason which
would affect the chances of a successful future marriage should therefore be
regarded as ajust cause for ending an engagement, including, as was the case
here, a simple unwillingness by one of the parties to enter into the marriage.
What is interesting is the use by analogy of the concept of 'irretrievable
breakdown of the engagement', 3 which confirms the idea that moral
blameworthiness should be irrelevant for the purpose of breach ofpromise, at
least to the extent that it has become irrelevant to the dissolution of a
marriage. 39 Whether or not the termination of the engagement was justified
is not decisive for the claim for sentimental damages. 40 However, because
nothing was said in this regard, the lack ofajust reason for the termination of
the engagement may remain a factor in the claim for contractual damages.
This raises the question whether a claim for actual loss, where, for instance,
one party decides not to continue with the marriage a day before the
wedding, would be frustrated by the fact that the termination of the
engagement was justified.
The second set of suggestions places claims for sentimental damages on an
equal footing with other actions for iniuria. The requirements for such claims
would be wrongfulness of the conduct, tested objectively against the ground
of reasonableness, and animus iniuriandi on the part of the person who breaks
off the engagement. The subjectively-wounded feelings of the plaintiff are
therefore not sufficient to found the claim. 41 These suggestions would limit
the availability of sentimental damages in situations where the plaintiff
perceives the conduct as hurtful and humiliating, but where, objectively
speaking, they are not regarded as such. Placing breach of promise on the
same footing as other instances of iniuria implies that the emotional and
reputational damage incurred is no different from iniuria issuing from any
other source. Together with the suggested developments in relation to
contractual breach, the effect is to reduce 42 the distinctiveness which had
hitherto characterised the legal response to intimate personal relationships, by
treating them as if the parties had been strangers engaged in impersonal
31 Ibidpara 6.
3' Although the main ground for divorce no longer rests on morally or sexually
reprehensible conduct, guilt continues to play a role in forfeiture of benefits, mainte-
nance and redistribution of assets at divorce, and adultery provides evidence of the
breakdown of a marriage. To say that guilt plays no role in divorce is therefore an
overstatement.
40 VanJaarsveld v Bridges supra note 35 paras 4, 19.
41 Ibid.
42 It does not place them on a par with dealings between strangers in all respects, as
will become clear from the discussions below.
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transactions. Arguably, this is problematic. I shall return to this issue later in
this article.
43
The judgment is most sweeping in its suggestion that contractual claims for
prospective loss should not be entertained in future. Three sets of arguments
are provided for this conclusion, with the first relating to the practical
difficulties of proving the duration of the marriage and the property regime
to which the marriage would have been subject. 44 These difficulties are, of
course, not insurmountable as illustrated by contractual claims for prospec-
tive loss in non-familial contexts. HarmsJA merely states that
,the court cannot work on any assumption, especially not one that the marriage
would on the probabilities have been in community of property. And if the
agreement was to marry in community, can one party not change her or his
mind without commercial consequences?' 45
However, it could be argued that, in the absence of contradictory evidence,
the court should assume that the parties would have married in community
of property, since this is the default matrimonial property system. The
absence of evidence that the parties would have concluded an antenuptial
contract means that the presumption of a marriage in community is not
rebutted, not that no assumption can be made at all.
The second argument is that '[a]n agreement to enter into an antenuptial
contract is not binding because it must be entered into notarially'.46 This
appears to reflect the well-known contractual rule that where formalities are
required for the conclusion of a contract, an agreement which does not
comply with these formalities is not valid.47 However, in the context of
family law, the established rule has long been that an unregistered antenuptial
contract, while not binding upon third parties, is binding upon the spouses. 48
Moreover, neither the common law nor legislation contains any formal
requirements for an agreement to enter into an antenuptial contract, which
seems to be that to which the court is referring. The court's reasoning on this
point is therefore open to challenge.
Directly contradicting the thrust of the second argument is the final
justification: that an engagement should not be treated on a rigidly contrac-
tual footing. It is in this context that the court made the radical suggestion 49
that
'[i]t is difficult to justify the commercialisation of an engagement in view of the
fact that a marriage does not give rise to a commercial or rigidly contractual
relationship. An engagement is in my view more of an unenforcable pactum de
43 See part III below.
44 VanJaarsveld v Bridges supra note 35 paras 9, 10.
45 Ibidpara 9.
46 Ibidpara 10.47johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A).
48 Ex parte Spinazze 1985 (3) SA650 (A).
4V anJaarsveld v Bridges supra note 35 paras 7, 8.
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contrahendo providing a spatium deliberandi - a time to get to know each other
better and to decide whether or not to marry finally. ' 50
This contradiction illustrates the tension between treating an engagement as
a mere social arrangement, on the one hand, and applying the principles of
the law of contract, on the other hand. The court's ambivalence about the
legal nature of an engagement becomes even more patent in its suggestion
that in order for claims for wasted expenses to succeed,
Ithe losses must have been within the contemplation of the parties. The
"innocent" party must be placed in the position in which she or he would have
been had the relevant agreement not been concluded; and what the one has
received must be set off against what the other has paid or provided.' 51
This is a summary of the contractual rules for negative interesse damages and
the authority used by the court (Probert v Baker5 2) is derived from contract
law.
The suggestions by the Supreme Court of Appeal about the future legal
developments were obiter dicta. Nevertheless, these suggestions for a drastic
curtailment of the remedies for breach of promise and the reasoning on
which they are based have already been followed almost verbatim by the high
court in Cloete v Maritz,5 3 holding that a claim for prospective loss no longer
exists. The judgment in Van Jaarsveld v Bridges is also noteworthy for its
contradictory stance on the legal nature of an engagement. On the one hand,
there are strong indications that engagements should not be treated like
commercial contracts, while, on the other hand, the judgment is explicitly
framed in terms of contractual concepts and principles. Both positions are
used simultaneously and interchangeably to justify the limitation of existing
rights upon breach of promise. The case therefore raises important issues
about the nature both of engagements and marriage to which I shall return
below. 4
(c) Ponelat v Schrepfer55
Two years later an appeal was heard in a matter involving an elderly couple
who were engaged and had cohabited for sixteen years. The female plaintiff
claimed a portion of the defendant's assets on the basis that a universal
partnership existed between them. Alternatively, she claimed maintenance.
50 Pacta de contrahenda in the form of options and pre-emptions are, in fact,
enforced in contract law. Agreements to negotiate may be enforceable, but the law is
not yet settled. See Evejesh Market irginia v Shoprite Checkers 2012 (1) SA256 (CC);
Indwe Aviation v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa 2012 (6) SA 6
(WCC). See also D Bhana 'The contract of pre-emption as an agreement to agree'
(2008) 71 THRHR 568.
51 Van Jaarsveld v Bridges supra note 35 para 11.
52 1983 (3) SA229 (D).
53 2013 (5) SA488 (WCC).
54 Inpart 11(b).55 2012 (1) SA206 (SCA).
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Her second claim was for iniuria due to breach ofpromise.5 6 The court a quo
had dismissed the claims for maintenance and iniuria, but had found that a
universal partnership existed between the parties. The appeal related to the
latter finding only.
The facts showed that the plaintiff had contributed her income, the
proceeds of the sale of her house, and substantial administrative labour to
various business ventures owned by the defendant, in addition to performing
housekeeping tasks. Applying the requirements for establishing a universal
partnership as set out by Pothier,5 7 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that
the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing the existence of a universal
partnership, and awarded her a 35 per cent share of the partnership assets. It
held that a universal partnership can be concluded tacitly and that it can
co-exist with a marriage or an engagement.58 The test for the existence of
such a tacit universal partnership was drawn from Miih/mann v Miih/mann5 9
and was formulated by the court as follows:
I whether it was more probable than not that a tacit agreement had been
reached". It was also stated [in Muhlmann] that a court must be careful to ensure
that there is an animus contrahendi and that the conduct from which a contract is
sought to be inferred is not simply that which refiects what is ordinarily to be expected
of a wife in a given situation.' 60
Based on the conduct of the parties and the nature and duration of the
plaintiffs contributions the court found that such a partnership had indeed
been established,61 adding that 'plaintiffs conduct was not simply what is
ordinarily to be expected from a cohabitee'.62 I shall deal with the issue of
proving a universal partnership below. 63
(d) Butters v Mncora64
The final case in the series involved a twenty-year cohabitation relationship
between parties who had also been engaged for half of that time. Unlike the
Ponelat case, the female plaintiff could not establish that she had made a
significant financial contribution, but she had maintained the home and
cared for the defendant, his child from another relationship and the two
young children who had been born to the parties.
16 Ibidparas 2-15.
17 Ibid para 19: '(1) that each of the partners bring something into the partnership,
whether it be money, labour or skill; (2) that the business should be carried on for the
joint benefit of the parties; and (3) that the object should be to make a profit (Pothier
A Treatise on the Contract of Partnership (Tudor's translation) 1.3.8).'
58 Ibid para 22.
9 1984 (3) SA102 (A) at 124C-D.
60 VanJaarsveld v Bridges supra note 35 para 20 (emphasis added).
61 Ibidpara 23.
62 Ibid.
63 See part 111(c).
64 Supra note 7.
COMMON LAW OF BREACH OF PROMISE AND UNIVERSAL PARTNERSHIPS 87
The most noteworthy aspect of the case is the extension of the universal
partnership from commercial ventures to include the home-life of the
parties. Relying on the authority of Felicius-Boxelius the court held that, not
only could a universal partnership result from a tacit agreement, 65 but it could
encompass benefits which were not commercial in nature. 66 For this reason,
non-commercial contributions, such as childcare and homemaking, should
be considered when evaluating the parties' entitlements to partnership
assets. 67 The recognition of the kinds of relationship contributions which
women most often make was based on the 'greater awareness in modem
society of the value of the contribution of those who are prepared to sacrifice
the satisfaction of pursuing their own careers, in the best interests of their
families' .68
The minorityjudgment of Heher and Cachalia JJA professed to agree with
the majority exposition of the law, but held that the plaintiff had not
discharged the onus to show that a tacit universal partnership had been
concluded. They cited the plaintiffs failure to participate in the defendant's
business affairs and the oft-quoted dictum from Miihlmann v Miihlmann to
assert that
'[w]hen parties cohabit in a state of amity over a long period, as here, and a
family results, it is likely that certain things will happen: the principal
breadwinner will contribute substantially, either regularly or on an ad hoc basis,
to the needs of the family by providing accommodation, food, clothing,
education, transport and healthcare. To these will usually be added vacations
and presents of various kinds. The other party, usually the woman, will stay at
home or engage in lesser employment and oversee the needs of the family and
the upbringing of the children. These are the normal incidents of cohabitation, just as
they are of marriage. That they happened in the case under consideration
contributes nothing to the present enquiry because they are at best equivocal,
absent some evidential feature that links them to the special intention that
attaches to a universal partnership.' 69
Apart from substantially deviating from the majority view that non-
commercial contributions should be taken into account, this assertion
amounts to the imposition of an additional, sexist requirement upon female
partners in universal partnerships. I will return to the gendered implications
of this view below.
In his majority judgment BrandJA declined to use the 'normal incidents'
argument from Miihlmann, distinguishing that case on the basis that it dealt
with marriage, where the duties of wives are generally agreed upon and
cannot be directly imposed upon cohabitation relationships. 7 The majority
also held that the universal partnership, like any other contract, is subject to
65 Ibidpara 15.
66 Ibidparas 18, 20.
67 Ibidparas 19, 22.
68 Ibid para 22.
69 Ibid para 37 (emphasis supplied).
70 Ibidpara 29.
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good faith and that a mental reservation by the defendant to the effect that he
would not share any material assets at the end of the relationship would
therefore not benefit him.7 The minority, by contrast, held that the
defendant 'said and did nothing to treat the respondent as other than an ad
hoc recipient of the fruits of his labours according to his own generosity (or
tight-fistedness) at any given time'.72
III AN EVALUATION OF THE JURISPRUDENCE ON BREACH
OF PROMISE AND UNIVERSAL PARTNERSHIPS
(a) Overview
An overview of the legal progression in the four cases shows how the court in
Sepheri questioned the continued existence of the common-law action for
prospective loss for breach of promise, while its final award amounted to a
share of existing partnership assets rather than damages for loss of future
(prospective) benefits. This was followed by the narrowing of the action for
sentimental damages and extension of the concept of a just cause for ending
an engagement in Van Jaarsveld. This case also placed claims for actual loss on
a more contractual footing, while at the same time strongly suggesting that
claims for future loss should no longer be entertained. The most startling
suggestion in this case was that engagements should no longer be treated as
legally enforceable agreements, but as unenforceable pacta de contrahendo.
The first two cases therefore represent the application of general contractual
and delictual principles to limit the sui generis common-law remedies for
breach ofpromise, while also proposing that these remedies should be further
curtailed and possibly entirely discarded. However, they simultaneously hint
at the possibility of using universal partnerships to share property amassed by
one party to an engagement or cohabitation relationship.
Ponelat represents an expansion of the remedies available to certain groups
of engaged people and cohabitees by allowing for a tacit universal partner-
ship. The group of potential beneficiaries was confirmed and further
extended in the majority judgment in Butters by the finding that a universal
partnership could extend beyond commercial ventures, and that homemak-
ing and childcare should be regarded as contributions to a universal
partnership.
Although I do not suggest that the developments in the four cases under
discussion represent a conscious strategy to this effect, read together, they
limit existing remedies for breach of promise and place the remaining
remedies on a more rigidly contractual footing. This reduces the number of
people able to claim on the basis of breach of promise. Simultaneously,
however, the courts have created an opportunity for cohabitants in a
universal partnership to acquire some benefit from (particularly a woman's)
family labour. This remedy is available to all cohabitants, including those
71 Ibidpara 27.
72 Ibid para 44.
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who are engaged. We see, therefore, both a contraction and an expansion of
potential remedies, and a shift in the basis on which remedies are awarded
from the 'status' of being engaged, to contract, both in the guise of a universal
partnership agreement and the more strict application of contractual rules to
engagements. Various obiter dicta, but especially the obiter dictum from Van
Jaarsveld, question the traditional enforceability of remedies for breach of
promise,73 presaging a more complete shift from status to contract in the
future. In the parts of this article below I analyse various aspects of these
judgments.
(b) The legal nature of engagements and the remedies for breach ofpromise
Viewed together, this line of cases raises two questions about engagements.
The first is whether engagements are normal contracts with contractual
remedies, or whether they retain something of the sui generis nature, as was
reflected in the common-law remedies.
In its assessment of the claim for actual loss, the court in VanJaarsveld gave
two strong indications that engagements should be treated in accordance
with the rules of contract. The first is the use of the negative interesse
principle to calculate damages where the contract has been cancelled, and
that the plaintiff is to be placed in a hypothetical position - namely the
position she would have occupied, had the contract not been concluded.
These rules are adopted from a claim for wasted expenses in the contracts case
of Probert v Baker.74 The second indication is the use of the contemplation
principle,75 which can be used in the law of contract tojudge the availability
of special damages.76 Using the contemplation principle in this situation is
questionable, since wasted expenses relating to wedding preparations and so
forth should probably be categorised as general damages for breach of
promise - that is, the kinds of losses which are naturally and generally
expected to flow from a breach of promise, to which neither the contempla-
73 See the text at note 50.
74 Supra note 52. Although the courts in Mainline Carriers vJaad Investments 1998
(2) SA 486 (C) and Emadyl Industries CC t/a Raydon Industries v Formex Engineering
2012 (4) SA 29 (ECP) held that a plaintiff in a contractual suit could generally claim
negative interesse, as long as this did not exceed her positive interesse, other courts
have held steadfastly that a contractual claim should be based on positive, rather than
negative interesse: see Hamerv Wall 1993 (1) SA235 (T). Claims for negative interesse
are usually allowed where a misrepresentation led to the conclusion of a contract.
Generally on this issue, see Dale Hutchison 'Back to basics: Reliance damages for
breach of contract revisited' (2004) 121 SALJ 51.
7' That is, that damages can be claimed if, at the time of the conclusion of the
contract, the parties contemplated that breach of the contract would result in this kind
ofloss.
76 Although the contemplation principle is favoured in some contractual cases, it
seems that the convention principle remains applicable in South African law. See
generally Lavery & Co Ltd vjungheinrich 1931 AD 156; Thoroughbred Breeders'Associa-
tion v Price Waterhouse 2001 (4) SA551 (SCA); Transnet Ltd t a National Ports Authority
v Owner ofMV Snow Crystal 2008 (4) SA 111 (SCA).
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tion nor the convention principle should apply. Nevertheless, the court's use
of contractual concepts in relation to wasted expenses suggests that an
engagement should be treated like any other contract, which is most often
concluded at arms' length between strangers in a commercial setting.
A third set of dicta which contradict the contractual approach in relation to
wasted expenses, and which is also internally contradictory, is to be found in
the courts' reasoning that claims for prospective (future) loss should no longer
be available. On the one hand, the court in Van Jaarsveld uses the argument
that the agreement to conclude an antenuptial contract is not enforceable
because this contract must be notarially concluded - a formalities argument
from the law of contract. On the other hand, it suggests that breach of
promise should not be treated on a 'rigidly contractual' basis because of the
difficulties associated with proving prospective loss. Prospective loss is
claimable in contract despite the associated evidentiary problems.77 In fact,
the normal measure for assessing contractual damages (positive interesse)
aims to place the plaintiff in the position she would have been in had the
contract been properly fulfilled .7 This would include future loss, subject to
the plaintiff s duty to mitigate her loss.
My analysis shows that, at least in Van Jaarsveld, the Supreme Court of
Appeal vacillated between treating an engagement as a normal contract and
failing correctly to apply the normal rules of contract. Most importantly, both
the application of contractual rules and the refusal to apply them were used in
ways that limit the claims of plaintiffs in breach of promise cases, who are, for
the most part, women. On the one hand, the strict application of contractual
rules limits claims for wasted expenses. On the other hand, a refusal to apply
normal contractual rules and remedies also limits claims for prospective loss.
The second, more fundamental question raised by these cases is whether
engagements should be regarded as mere social arrangements without legal
consequences, as Harms DP suggested in Van Jaarsveld v Bridges. The court in
both the subsequent cases of Ponelat and Butters awarded relief on the basis of
universal partnerships rather than breach of promise. What are the benefits
and disadvantages of replacing claims for breach of promise with claims based
on universal partnerships?
Most obviously, universal partnerships are not limited to people who were
engaged, and the claimants could therefore be expanded to unmarried
cohabitants and possibly even to people married out of community of
property.79 Moreover, a universal partnership could conceivably exist even
where one of the parties was married to another person. According to the
common law no action for breach of promise would be available in these
77 SDR Investment Holdings Co (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank Ltd 2007 (4) SA 190 (C).
71 Hamer v Wall supra note 74.
71 Muhlmann v Muhlmann supra note 59; Ponelat v Schrepfersupra note 55 para 27.
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circumstances.8 0 However, in Zulu v Zulu"' a claim for a universal partner-
ship was brought against the deceased estate of a man who was involved in a
bigamous marriage. The existing marriage was in community of property
and the wife in the second, invalid marriage argued that a universal
partnership existed between her and the deceased. Hugo J held that where
the existing marriage was in community ofproperty, no universal partnership
could exist with the second spouse because that contract would be unlawful
and because the deceased could not have had the intention to conclude a
universal partnership with the second wife involving assets which belonged
to thejoint estate of the legal marriage. The courts' reasoning could be said to
create the possibility of a universal partnership co-existing with a lawful
marriage which is out of community of property. Then again, it may be
argued that such a universal partnership would be contra bonos mores and
thus illegal, being similar to an engagement concluded with a spouse in an
existing marriage.
Another difference between universal partnerships and breach of promise
is that the former gives a claim to the assets already accumulated in the
relationship, rather than a share of potential future benefits. This means that a
claim based on a universal partnership will not be reduced by speculating
about the probable duration of the marriage or the plaintiffs chances of
remarriage, as would a claim for prospective loss under breach of promise.
The quantum of a claim based on a universal partnership would therefore be
easier to establish. There is, however, a potential problem in the fact that the
cases based on universal partnership have awarded relatively low percentages
of the partnership assets to the plaintiffs. I will discuss this below. 82
Additionally, the rules of universal partnership do not allow for compensa-
tion for wasted expenses in cases where engagements are terminated shortly
before the intended marriages. It seems that the sui generis action for breach
of promise remains necessary at least to claim wasted wedding expenses and
that for this reason it should not be entirely discarded. Similarly, there are
circumstances in which the termination of the engagement would be so
insulting that a claim for iniuria should continue to be recognised.
(c) Universal partnerships
The most significant aspect of the Supreme Court ofAppeal's jurisprudence
on breach of promise and universal partnerships is that it signals a diminished
role for the status of being engaged in favour of regulating relationships on
the basis of a contract of universal partnership.8 3 Like marriage, engagements
" Claassen v Van der Watt 1969 (3) SA68 (T); Benefeld v West 2011 (2) SA379 (GSJ).
Where the plaintiff did not know that the defendant was married, she may, according
to Snyman v Snyman 1984 (4) SA262 (W), still claim under the actio iniuriarum.
1" 2008 (4) SA12 (D).
82 Part 111(c).
83 For further discussion, see Stephen Cretney 'The family and the law - Status or
contract?' (2003) 15 Child & Family LQ 403, and Elsje Bonthuys 'Family contracts'
(2004) 121 SALJ 879 in the South African context.
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have always contained elements of contract, because of the requirement that
they be voluntarily entered into by the parties. However, like marriage,
engagements were regarded as sui generis in giving rise to claims for iniuria,
4
claims for the return of gifts, and in not being subject to claims for specific
performance.8 5 Basing property remedies on universal partnerships repre-
sents a more purely contractual paradigm than the sui generis remedies
hitherto available for breach of promise. However, the rules of universal
partnership, as articulated by the Supreme Court of Appeal, remain infused
with, and subordinate to, the familial status associated with marriage. This is
so in several respects.
First and most obviously, the Butters judgment has extended the nature of
partnership property and partnership contributions to create a hybrid
between commercial and domestic partnership. This hybridisation is crucial
to addressing the financial dependencies which arise as a result of family
relationships, and is therefore to be welcomed unequivocally.
More problematic, however, are issues of proof which reflect the same
sexist assumptions and stereotypes which pervade the law of marriage, and
which contradict the idea that engagements are henceforth to be regulated
purely by the law of contract. I highlight the following four issues in the cases
under discussion: the question whether the universal partnerships were orally
or tacitly concluded; the evidentiary weight of the failure of the men to
transfer property to their female partners; the absence of reasonable reliance
in the cases; and the characterisation of female cohabitants' household and
childcare labour as simply 'what can be expected' from them.
Pothier's requirements for universal partnerships do not include any
formalities and they must, therefore, be capable of being entered into orally.
In both Sepheri and Ponelat the plaintiffs gave evidence of verbal statements to
the effect that the partners would share equally in the accumulated assets.
Nevertheless, and despite apparently accepting the plaintiffs' evidence to this
effect, both courts insisted on treating the partnership agreement as tacit,
rather than one which was orally concluded. This means that, instead of the
plaintiffs evidence of an oral agreement being sufficient to establish the
existence of the partnership, the courts could consider a range of additional
factors to establish whether the parties intended to conclude a partnership
contract.
8 6
Treating these contracts as tacit in the face of evidence of oral agreements
places additional evidentiary burdens on the female plaintiffs, while provid-
ing further opportunities for the defendants to cast doubt on the existence of
84 Sentimental damages are not available for breach of contract: see Administrator
Natal vEdouard 1990 (3) SA581 (A).
85 In Roman-Dutch law the wronged party could claim an order for specific
performance of the engagement contract: see F P van den Heever Breach of Promise and
Seduction in South African Law (1954) 5, 11; R W Lee An Introduction to Roman-Dutch
Law5 ed (1953) 51.
86 Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co [1918] 1 KB 592 at 605; W'Vest End Diamonds Ltd
vJohanneshug StockExchange 1946AD 910; Wlkins v Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A).
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the contract. One of the factors which were held to indicate that there was no
universal partnership in Sepheri and the minorityjudgment in Butters was the
defendants' failure to act in accordance with their oral statements that all
property was held in common. This failure was taken to indicate a lack of
animus contrahendi on the part of the defendants and thus to show that the
parties had no consensus on the universal partnership. The majority in Butters
disagreed with this approach, holding that the defendant's unexpressed
mental reservation should not protect him from a claim that a universal
partnership existed.1
One of the ways to resolve the issue in the law of contract would be to use
the doctrines of reasonable reliance and mistake to establish whether the
parties had indeed entered into a contract of universal partnership. The
plaintiffs argument would be that she had relied upon the appearance of
consensus between the parties that there was a universal partnership and that
her reliance was reasonable. The appearance of consensus would have been
created both by the verbal assurances that the partners would share every-
thing equally and by the actual sharing during the relationship. The
defendant, in contrast, could refute the existence of a universal partnership if
he had been under a mistaken impression caused by the plaintiff or of which
the plaintiff was aware or should reasonably have been aware., In all of these
cases, this argument would not have availed the defendants, whose mistakes
were in fact the result of either an unexpressed mental reservation 9 or a
change of heart when the relationship started to falter. The defendants'
mistakes would therefore not have been justus and the contract of universal
partnership would have been allowed to stand.
Instead of using the contractual doctrine of reasonable reliance to support
the plaintiffs' assertion of a universal partnership, the court in Ponelat and the
minority in Butters required that the plaintiffs show that their contributions
were over and above what could have been expected from a wife or
cohabitant in the plaintiffs situation. This directly contradicts and under-
mines the idea of valuing the kinds of family contributions which women
generally make, as expressed by the majority in Butters. It draws upon and
reinforces the sexist devaluation of women's caretaking work within the
family, in particular the assumptions that it is not 'real' work, and that it
should not be remunerated or financially compensated, 90 which is at the root
of women's poverty after divorce and separation. Moreover, this test is
87 Supra note 7 para 27.
88 Brink v Humphries &Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 (2) SA419 (SCA).
89 This was, in effect, decided by the majority in Butters v Mncora supra note 7 para
27 where it held that 'a]n unexpressed mental reservation on the part of the defen-
dant, that he was willing to share in the benefits derived from the plaintiffs contribu-
tion, but not in the surplus fruits of his own'would not assist the defendant in escaping
the contract of universal partnership.
90 Elsje Bonthuys Labours of love: Child custody and the division of matrimonial
property at divorce' (2001) 64 THRHR 195.
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derived from the law of marriage, 91 and is therefore at odds with the law of
contract.
In addition to the problems of proving the existence of a universal
partnership, another serious problem with the jurisprudence on universal
partnerships is the percentages of the partnership assets awarded to the female
plaintiffs. In Butters the plaintiff received 30 per cent, and in Ponelat 35 per
cent of the partnership assets. The court in Sepheri awarded 25 per cent of the
partnership assets to the plaintiff, albeit under the guise of loss of future
financial benefits. These low percentages indicate that even though value has
to be placed on the non-financial contributions which women typically
make, their contributions are still undervalued in comparison with the purely
financial contributions typically made by their male partners. Moreover, the
female plaintiffs in these cases were, in one case, close to retirement, and in
the other case, had given up most of her economically productive years to
take care of children. The low percentage awarded in Sepheri illustrates that
younger women or childless women may be regarded with less sympathy
despite having made similar contributions to their family lives, and may
receive little or no part of the accumulated assets.
The claim based on a universal partnership provides no rights to mainte-
nance after the dissolution of the relationship. The question must then be
asked, given the low percentages which the courts have awarded thus far, and
the lack of maintenance rights, whether claims for a portion of the assets
already amassed based on universal partnerships are preferable to claims for
actual and prospective loss based on breach of promise. For some engaged
cohabitants, the latter claims may have been more advantageous, especially
where it could be proven that the marriage would have been in community
of property.
(d) Future developments of universal partnerships within and without marriage
It could be premature to speculate about future developments of the law of
universal partnerships so soon after the decision in Butters. However, it might
be useful to point to issues and questions which may need to be resolved in
future.
Given that the court in Ponelat agreed that universal partnerships could be
formed between people who are married to one another,92 and given that it
was used in a marriage out of community of property in Miihlmann v
Miihlmann to award a share of the husband's business to his wife, universal
partnerships could potentially provide a mechanism to overcome the
iniquitous consequences of complete separation of property in circumstances
where the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 does not allow for a redistribution order.93
Although this has not been done after the Miihlmann case, the Supreme
91 Derived from Muhlmann v Mihlmann supra note 59 which dealt with a marriage
out of community of property.
92 Supra note 55 para 22.
13 Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act.
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Court of Appeal's willingness to use universal partnerships in cohabitation
relationships may signal a revival of this mechanism, and the court's
willingness to take homemaking and caring work into account may extend
the applicability of this case to marriages where the wife's contribution was
not primarily financial. This would go some way towards the general
redistributive discretion in relation to marital property long advocated by
academic commentators. 94 However, in JW v CW 95 the court held that a
tacit universal partnership could not exist where it contradicts the terms of an
antenuptial contract that the marriage is out of community of property. This
decision reflects a fear that universal partnerships will be used to circumvent
the chosen matrimonial property regime, which may limit the use of the
universal partnership as a redistributive mechanism in marriages out of
community ofproperty.
A related question is whether the universal partnership can be used where
one of the parties is married to another person. This would not only provide
a property claim where an action for breach of promise has been held not to
exist,96 but could also bypass the decision in Zulu v Zulu, 97 which denied the
wife in a bigamous marriage an action where she was unaware of the prior
existence of a valid marriage.
The jurisprudence on same-sex cohabitants established that partners can
have reciprocal rights and duties of support if they 'undertake' them. 98 In
Paixao v Road Accident Fund99 the Supreme Court of Appeal extended the
reasoning regarding the undertaking of a duty of support to opposite-sex
cohabitants in the context of dependents' actions for loss of support.
Logically, this argument should also extend to a general right to maintenance
for parties in opposite-sex cohabitation relationships who can prove that they
have agreed to support one another, at least for the duration of the
relationship and, depending on the terms of the agreement, possibly even
after the termination of the relationship. Whether the courts would be
prepared to go this far remains to be seen.
IV CONCLUSIONS: STATUS OR CONTRACT?
The changes in relation to opposite-sex cohabitation and engagements
discussed in this article must be seen in the context of two other sets of
developments in family law. The first is the extension of rights to same-sex
cohabitants by the courts before the enactment of the Civil Union Act 17 of
94 Brigitte Clark & Beth Goldblatt 'Gender and family law' in Elsje Bonthuys &
Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gende, Law andJustice (2007) 195, 224; Jacqueline Heaton
'Striving for substantive gender equality in family law: Selected issues' (2005) 21
SAJHR 547 at 556, 562.
95 2012 (2) SA529 (NCK).
96 Claassen v Van der Watt supra note 80.
97 Supra note 81.
98 Satchwell v President of the RSA 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) paras 23, 24; Du Plessis v Road
Accident Fund 2004 (1) SA359 (SCA) para 14.
99 Supra note 3. See also Verheem v Road Accident Fund 2012 (2) SA409 (GNP).
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2006. As a result, it has been argued that opposite-sex cohabitants are now in
a less favourable position and that similar rights should be afforded to them.
The second is the Law Reform Commission's Discussion Paper on the rights
of cohabitants which contains suggestions and draft legislation for affording
rights to a range of cohabitation relationships, including registered and de
facto relationships.100 After the adoption of the Civil Union Act, these
proposals seem to have been placed on the backburner, perpetuating both the
legal gap with regard to the property rights of opposite-sex cohabitants and
the unequal treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex cohabitants. The
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Appeal on universal partnerships
represents a development of the common law which attempts to address
these issues.
Another thread which can be detected in the cases reforming the law
applying to engagements and cohabitation is that the existing common-law
rules were outdated and did not accord with changed social practices,
especially the position of women in contemporary society. In Van Jaarsveld v
Bridges the court held that the 'historic approach to engagements is outdated
and does not recognise the mores of our time',10 1 while Davis J in Sepheri v
Scanlan quoted with approval the following statement ofJoubert (translated
here in English):
'In modern times women are not dependant on marriage for economic survival
and the satisfaction of their needs. There is ample opportunity for them to take
part in economic life and for self-realisation. There are also many opportunities
to find alternative life partners. '102
This is a claim which seems to have been equally popular throughout the
ages, as evidenced by the dictum in the 1967 seduction case of Lourens v Van
Biljon10 3 that women at that time valued careers more than marriage. In the
1950s Lord Denning was reported to have said that '[the wife] is now indeed
the spoilt darling of the law, and [the husband] the patient pack-horse'.1 °4 At
one level these claims embody the truism that social circumstances have
'00 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 104 (Project 118)
Domestic Partnerships (2003). In March 2006 a Report on Domestic Partnerships was
published, which differed somewhat from the Discussion Paper. The first version of
the Civil Union Bill 26 of 2006 corresponded to the draft legislation suggested in the
Discussion Paper, while the final version of the Bill, which corresponded to the Civil
Union Act, was Bill 26B of 2006. The final version of the Bill and the Act omitted
the provisions relating to opposite-sex cohabitants.
101 Supra note 35 para 3.
102 Sepheri v Scanlan supra note 24 at 330H quoting Joubert op cit note 26 at 214.
The original reads: 'Vrouens is in die moderne tyd nie op 'n huwelik aangewese vir
hulle bestaanbeveiliging en behoeftesbevrediging nie. Daar is volop geleentheid vir
deelname aan die ekonomiese lewe en vir selfverwesenliking. Daar is ook volop
geleentheid vir die vind van 'n plaasvervanger huweliksmaat.'
103 1967 (1) SA703 (T) at 705F-H.
104 Quoted from The Times, 13 May 1950 by Julia Brophy & Carol Smart 'From
disregard to disrepute: The position ofwomen in family law' (1981) 9 Feminist Review
3at6.
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changed from those prevailing at the time when Roman-Dutch law was
received into South Africa. On another, more fundamental, level they also
assert that women have become socially and economically equal to men, and
that this requires legal rules which treat them on a basis of formal equality
with men.
Despite the abolition of such patently patriarchal concepts as the husband's
marital power, social, economic and legal gender equality remains an
aspiration rather than a social reality, especially in the context of intimate
relationships. The fallacious nature of claims of legal and social equality is of
course amply illustrated by the requirement in some of the judgments that,
for a woman to show that there was a universal partnership, she has to have
contributed more than that which could be normally expected of a wife. The
very same courts which claim to be treating women and men equally impose
additional burdens upon female partners by requiring that they should make
both financial and uncompensated family labour contributions.
This phenomenon is also illustrated by the facts of the cases. In two of the
four cases the courts accepted the plaintiffs' evidence that their male partners
had requested them to give up paid employment to either work in the men's
businesses or to take care of their children. In another case the female partner
gave up her employment to follow her fianc&e to the many foreign countries
in which he worked. These women did not give up their employment
simply because they were foolish. They did so in compliance with powerful
social and even religious norms which require women to serve their partners
and their children rather than pursue lucrative careers for their own financial
benefit. These norms apply in cohabitation relationships as they do in
marriages. 0 5 In fact, the courts' requirement that women do more than what
is to be expected from wives is an articulation of this very expectation.
Moreover, social science research and statistical data confirm that women are
less likely to be employed than men and when they are employed, they
generally occupy less senior positions and earn less.' 0 6 In South Africa these
inequalities are also racialised so that although white women on average earn
more than black men, all women earn less than men in the same racial
categories, with African women being worst off Within families, power and
money are unequally distributed with men most often retaining control over
resources, and male authority is far-too-often backed up by domestic
violence.' 07
Given this social context of gendered family roles and unequal economic
power within families, what then would be a transformatory legal response to
105 Lind op cit note 4 at 112.
106 See the sources cited in note 107 below.
107 Generally and for further authority, see Catherine Albertyn & Elsje Bonthuys
'Introduction' in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gender Law and.Justice
(2007) 7-8; Clark & Goldblatt op cit note 94 at 198-200; Elsje Bonthuys 'Gender and
work' in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gender Law and.Justice (2007)
244-9; Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 104 op cit note 100 paras 2.2.3-
22.
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the distribution of property at the end of cohabitation and engagement
relationships?
The expanded notion of a universal partnership and, especially, the
recognition of the value of the caring work traditionally undertaken by
women as set out in the majorityjudgment in Butters go a long way towards
valuing these relationships and protecting parties who have become finan-
cially vulnerable as a result of undertaking caring duties. It represents a
welcome deviation from the much-criticised logic of the majorityjudgment
in olks, which insisted that heterosexual cohabitants 'choose' to forego legal
rights by not entering into marriage. However, the universal partnership does
found a contractual remedy, based fundamentally on agreement between the
cohabitants. As such it is conceptually related to the concept of choice which
was held, in Volks, to limit the availability of remedies. On the one hand, this
is a positive development inasmuch as it indicates that even where people
'choose' not to get married, that does not mean that they 'choose' to be
without any legal protection. It thus extends the range of choices which,
according to Volks, cohabitants have. On the other hand, the individualistic,
contractual framework of contract on which the universal partnership is
based, falls short of recognising that people's relationship choices are
profoundly influenced by patriarchal social expectations, and that legal
remedies based on individual choices may not assist many of those women
most in need oflegal rights.
A purely contractual basis for property distribution represents a change in
the law, but it does not actually challenge the social paradigms which expect
women to provide unpaid family labour. Instead, it merely obscures gender
inequality behind a smokescreen of formally equal partners concluding
agreements at arms' length. Moreover, I have shown that, where contractual
rules would benefit women, courts hesitate to apply the rules of contract to
these relationships as they would in a purely commercial setting.
A 'relational' understanding of contracts may enable contract law to better
respond to the needs of female cohabitants.10 Nevertheless, basing property
rights for cohabitants on contract means that remedies will have to be sought
on a case-by-case basis and thus would be available only to those women
who can afford to litigate against their former partners. Moreover, the
amounts awarded tend to be relatively low and depend on the ability of the
trial court to understand the gendered dynamics of family life and to abandon
sexist stereotypes of what can be expected from a typical wife or cohabitant.
The adoption of a statutory framework which defines cohabitation relation-
ships and sets out clear rights would benefit a far larger group of women,
'0' See, for instance, Robert Leckey 'Relational contract and other models of mar-
riage' (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall LJ 1; L Hawthorne 'Legal tradition and the transforma-
tion of orthodox contract theory: The movement from formalism to realism' (2006)
12 Fundamina 71; L Hawthorne 'The first traces of relational contract theory: The
implicit dimension of co-operation' (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ234. This issue is, however,
beyond the scope of this article.
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most particularly those who cannot afford to litigate. It would bring legal
certainty to cohabitants in general. Finally, it would demonstrate a wider
social understanding of the gendered dynamics and dependencies which flow
from cohabitation relationships, and would place a high value on the caring
work which women undertake.
In the absence of legislation, however, the courts' treatment of unmarried
same-sex cohabitation shows that undertaking financial and other caring
responsibilities and sharing financial benefits is evidence of an agreement that
financial benefits should be equally shared at the end of the relationship. 109
109 See Paixao v RAF supra note 3, Verheem v RAF supra note 99 and the accompa-
nying discussion.
